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At its meeting of 18-19 March 1981, the Committee o n Economic a nd 
Monetary Affairs appointed Miss Forster as draftsman of an opihion for the 
committee on External Economic Relations. 
The draft opinion was adopted at the committee's meeting on 
14 September 1981 by 17 votes to 13. 
There were present: Mr J. Moreau, Chairman; Mr Albers 
(deputizing for Mr Wagner), Mrs Baduel-Glorioso (deputizing for Mr Leonardi), 
Mr Barbagli (deputizing for Mr Collomb), Mr Beazley, Mr von Bismarck, 
Mr Bonaccini, Mr Caborn, Mr Damseaux (deputizing for Mr Combe), Mr Diana 
(deputizing for Mr Macario), Mr Fernandez, Mrs Forster, Mr Franz, 
Mr Ghergo (deputizing for Mr Giavazzi), Mr Herman, Mr Hume (deputizing for 
Mr Walter), Mr Marshall (deputizing for Mr De Ferranti), Mr Mihr, 
Mr MUller-Hermann (deputizing for Mr I. Friedrich), Mr d'Ormesson 
(deputi zing for Mr Schnitker), Mr Pruvot (deputizing for Mr Dolorozoy), 
Mr Purvis, Mr Rogers, Mr Huffolo, Mr Schinzcl, Mr Seal (deputizing fur 
Mr Schwartzenberg) Mr Turner (deputizing for Mr Hopper), Mr Wedekind 
(deputizing for Mr Beumer), Mrs Wieczorek-Zeul (deputizing for Mr Wagner), 
Mr von Wagau. 
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1. The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs strongly endorses the 
central premise of the r~port by the Committee on External Economic Relations 
(Doc. l-866/80), namely that the Community has a great interest in successfully 
developing cooperation with the Gulf States. The Community countries have the 
necessary goods and skills but are undergoing a recession , which is being re-
inforced by unpredictable leaps in oil prices, to which they are highly vul-
nerable because of their oil import dependence. The Gulf States on the other 
hand have great energy resources and unabsorbed financial surpluses which have 
again grown greatly in the last couple of years , yet lack a diversified industrial 
and agricultural base and also many of the needed skills. Mechanisms whereby 
both sets of countries could be reinforced by matching the complementary strengths 
of each, would make a great contribution to them, and to the world economy in 
general. 
2. The report also cites a possible partnership between the EEC and the 
Gulf States in helping to spur economic growth in the resource-poor clLweloJ.>inq 
countries which have suffered the most from the oil crisis. This too could be a 
powerful benefit of such cooperation. 
3. Nevertheless, the constraints on the successful achievement of such 
cooperation agreements are also very great, including the often overriding 
political factors involved (such as the Palestinian question and East-West 
rivalry in the Gulf), the very great differences in circumstances between the 
various Gulf States cited in the report, the potential overlaps with other 
groups and negotiating fora (the new Gulf Cooperation Grouping, OAPEC, the Arab 
League, the Islamic Conference, OPEC and the Group of 77), and many other 
factors. 
4. It is not for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs to comment 
in detail on the political aspects of the report, and in fact we would suggest 
that political questions falling within the Euro-Arab dialogue should be kept 
separate from the financial, economic and trade measures proposed in the report. 
The successful development of the latter might even assist progress towards 
settlement of some of the supremely important political problems, whereas 
linking all the different aspects together could lead to failure on all fronts. 
The EEC itself began with joint action for coal and steel, followed by more 
general economic coordination, and questions of political cooperation are still 
being discussed and developed twenty years later. 
5 . In crude economic terms what can the Community offer and what can the 
Gulf States deliver? The main premise of the report is that these two could be 
matched in some form of "energy pact" whereby the Gulf States might "undertake 
to supply specific quantities of crude oil at uniform prices with a binding 
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formula to determine price changes'' . (paragraph 10- indent 1 of the reso-
lution). In exchange the EEC would offer the Gulf States a guaranteed suitable 
rate of interest for investment of their surpluses. (paragraph 10 - indent 2 
of the resolution) . 
6. The Gulf States should undertake to supply specific quantitites of 
crude oil at uniform prices with a binding formula to determine price changes . 
can the Gulf States do this? What mechanism would be used? Is it in the best 
interests of the EEC that such a deal should exist? 
(a) Can the Gulf States do this? 
It is clearly going to be difficult for the Gulf States to deliver on 
the oil supply side without, to cite one reason alone, undermining wider 
OAPEC and OPEC commitments and flexibility. In addition the possibility of 
conflict or changed circumstances in one or more of the Gulf States could 
undermine the whole basis of any contract and a "force ma jeure" situation 
could arise. Setting aside these difficulties, if a contract were negotiated, 
the long erm effect (how many year s is long term in this context?) would be 
that the Gulf States would be supplying stated amounts oil to the EEC at a 
price calculated according to a formula. At the same time each of the Gulf 
States would be selling oil outside the contract at OPEC prices·. If the OPEC 
price were higher the Gulf States would only wish to continue the contract if 
the return offered by the EEC on their invested surplus were high enough to 
compensate for the revenue lost on sales. If the OPEC price were to fall 
lower than the contract price the Gulf States would be delighted, but the 
EEC would suffer severe disadvantage. Should the contract therefore contain 
"a most favoured nation clause", and if it did wouldn't this mean that eventually 
the contract and OPEC prices would become the same, and that much of the 
value of the contract to either side would disappear? 
(b) What mechanism would be used? 
The report proposes a Community oil procurement and prospecting company. 
(Paragraph ~ of the resolution and details in the explanatory statement). 
This company is to operate in competition or collaboration with existing 
privately owned and nationalised oil companies. Individual members of the 
Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee have varying views on whether or not 
Community funds should be used to finance an EEC oil company, but would 
question how such a Company could operate if it were buying oil from the Gulf 
States at a different price from all other companies. If the price were 
lower than the OPEC level would it charge OPEC prices to subsequent customers 
and pass the profit to the Community Budget? If the price were higher than 
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OPEC , would f und s be availab le from the Community Budget to subsidise sules 
to customers? Assuming the contract was fo r 1 mbd , and a lower figure would 
not be worthwhile at the EEC level , at a price of approximately 35 EUA's a 
b arr el (i.e. about 35$), there would be a turnover o f some 10,000 million 
EUA's a year. The EEC budget is currently about 20,000 million EUA 's , and 
so an oil price variation of 10- 20% could have serious consequences for the 
budget. 
We feel that the practical difficulties in the way of the s uccessful 
operation of an EEC o il company would be immense and that the REX Committee 
should give further thought to how their suggested scheme wo u ld work out i n 
practice. For example, the ind i vidual Member State s have different l evels of 
oil imports and one arrangement might be that the shareholdings in t he EEC 
oil company would be held by National Governments pro rata to their level of 
impo rts and that oil supplied under the co ntract wo uld be allocated i n the 
same ratio. This could mean, for exampl e , tha t consum~ !'s in Germany would 
have a much greater a mo unt of oil avail abl e to them at thL' contract pr i,x~ 
than those in the U .I<. Whether the contract price v-1ere hiqher or lower than 
the OPEC price, a s ignificant difference between the two p rices would b e 
bound to have a distorting effect on t h e competitive position of the consumers 
in t he different Member States. 
(c) Is it in the best interests of t he EEC that such a deal 
should exist? 
At first sight the suggestio n that the EEC should have a guaranteed 
supply of oil from the Gulf States at a fixed price appears attractive . How-
ever as stated under (a) the guarantees c ould become meani ngless if there 
were conflict in one or more Gulf States or any othe r " fo r ce majeure" s itua-
tion which would be just the inoment when continuity of supply would be impor-
tant. There is also the possibility that further sources of oil will be found 
or developed faster than in t he Gulf Sta tes (in Russia , China , or South AmPric a , 
for example, or within the territory of the EEC itsel f) which would mea n the 
world price of oil might fall or at least not rise as fast in real terms as 
the oil from the Gulf States . Pric e is always a matter of supply and demand 
and if increased supplies of oil from new s ources are coupled with efforts by 
users to economise on the use of oil and to develop alternative source s of 
energy the EEC might be beterr advised to steer clear of a long term buying 
contract and to remain free to buy what oil it needs on the world market at 
the best price it can negotiate. This view is suppotted by the fact that the 
IEA estimates that b y the end of the century the OECD total oil impor ts from 
OPEC will be in the range 13 - 20 million barrels per day compared with the 
24 mbd current import level. 
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7. OPEC, and in particular the Gulf States, wish to develop their economies 
so that they are less dependent on oil but such radical structural changes 
are bound to be slow. It is, therefore, in the interests o f OPEC that the 
OECD should not move too rapidly to other sources of energy. Hence although 
since 1973 the West has been faced with fiercel y escalating oil prices, it 
may be that in the 1980's oil prices may level out or even fall (as they have 
done over the last 18 months) as the OPEC seeks to maintain oil supply and 
hence revenues as long as possible. There is no doubt that further vicious 
prices rises would cause users in the EEC to intensify their efforts to con-
serve energy and to speed up the change to non OPEC oil sources and to alterna-
tive sources of energy. The pattern for the 1980's may therefore be very 
different from the 1970's and would lead to the Gulf States probably wanting a 
long term supply contract. We sugges t that the EEC should either use this to 
negotiate advantageous terms or that the EEC should keep its options open re-
garding the supply of oil, and that it should take some other steps to encourage 
the Gulf States to come to an arrangement with the EEC to recirculate their 
petrodollar surplus. 
B. What else do the Gulf States reguire? 
They need to diversify their economics away from oil, and the safest 
direction for them to move would be towards the xploitation of alternative 
energy sources or towards industries which are high energy users. The Gulf 
States have relatively small populations, with insufficient numbers of scientists, 
engineers and technicians and a limited infrastructure. A good use for their 
petrodollars would be for capital intensive energy projects in other parts of 
the world, or to finance R & D programmes in the alternative energy field for 
subsequent licensing onwards to the sophisticated developed countries or at 
the other end of the scale to the poorest countries which can no longer afford 
to buy oil and need simple systems which can be used locally on the basis of 
wind, water or solar power or on some other indigenous energy source. In the 
Middle East and North Africa ·areas possibly the most potentially rewarding use 
of energy would be in the distillation and recovery of potable water from 
brackish and salt water and in pumping and irrigation systems so that horticul-
ture and agriculture can be developed. Other high energy uses (such as steel 
and aluminium production) would be open to competition from other low cost 
energy countries and some of these might not have such high transit costs to 
areas of high population where the customers for these industries mainly reside. 
9. Recycling problems 
Besides industrial cooperation the major theme of the draft motion is 
the need for cooperation in seeking solutions to recycling problems. This 
issue is wider than that of relations with the Gulf States although they do 
include most of the countries with really major financial surpluses. The 
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Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs agrees with the motion's assess-
ment, that cooperation between the Community and the Gulf States in this 
sphere is of crucial importance. It also agrees that promotion of the de-
velopment of the oil-importing developing countries should be a key objective 
of such cooperation. The Economic and Monetary Committee suggests that any 
deal the EEC negotiates with the Gulf States to promote the recycling of 
petrodollar surpluses should relate to one or more of the items discussed 
under (8) above and that the REX Committee should come forward with some 
concrete proposals in its final report. The specific issues raised, however, 
are of great complexity and will be handled in more detail in a forthcoming 
report from this Committee. It should, however, be underlined in this con-
text that the idea of a guarantee fund whereby the EEC states would offer the 
Gulf States a guaranteed suitable rate of interest for their investment of 
surpluses requires much more detailed study than the REX Committee have so 
far given it. 
10. Conclusions 
To summarize then, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs agrees 
on the value of seeking cooperation agreements between the Community as a 
whole and the Gulf States. Among the general possibilities listed in the 
draft motion it strongly supports higher joint financing of development pro-
jects in countries of the ~ird World, and also the general concept of seeking 
solutions to recycling problems although the specifics need to be more careful-
ly examined. The EEC should help the Gulf States in the diversification of 
their economies ·away from undue dependence on oil. Firstly, we suggest 
this should be in the field o f alternative energy sources e ither by join t 
EEC/Gulf State investment in capital intensive energy projects in the EEC and 
in other parts of the world or by joint financing of R & D programmes in this 
field which would lead to revenues from subsequent world wide licensing of 
patents or know how. Secondly, the EEC should assist the Gulf States in the 
development of projects which are high energy users. The most rewarding of 
these especially in the Middle East and North Africa could be the recovery of 
potable water from brackish or salt water and in pumping and irrigation systems 
so that horticulture and agriculture can be developed. Other high energy uses 
(such as steel and aluminium production) could also be developed within the 
Gulf States. Further consideration should be given to how far the EEC could 
go in supporting these so that damage to the Communities own industries within 
the EEC and in third country markets is kept to a minimum. 
If agreement on the lines of the proposals made in the draft motion is 
to be reached it will have to be on the basis of a very simple package deal. 
At present there are simply too many variables in the proposals to stand any 
real chance of success, and if we are to succeed the political problems must 
be excluded as far as possible from the agreement. 
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ll. In addition to the suggestions made above the Economic and Monetary 
Affairs Committee suggests the following changes in the Motion for a Resolution: 
(a) Omit paragraph 6. For the reasons already stated we want to keep 
the deal as simple as possible to enhance the changes of success and to try 
for the inclusion of the largest possible number of sectors is fundamentally 
wrong. Also, we feel that apart from the major projects of the type discussed 
under (8} above and possibly also cooperation in the field of training which 
are best done at the Community or Member State level, all such items as transfers 
of technology and joint ventures should remain within the province of private 
enterprise and they should not be subject to interference from the Community. 
The exclusion of Community or State financial interest would also help in keep-
ing the arrangements separate from political manoeuvring. 
(b) In paragraph 8 and in the Explanatory Statement more detail should 
be given on how the EEC oil company should operate. 
(c) In paragraph 9 all reference to petrochemical products and basic 
chemical products should be excluded in order to avoid damage to the EEC's 
own industries (c.f. the problems caused by U.S exports to the EEC and third 
countries of these types of product based on very low naphtha and gas prices 
in the USA) . 
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